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Abstract
Two experiments on the impact of happy and sad moods on the 
processing of persuasive communications are reported and their 
implications for various models of affect and cognition are 
discussed. In Experiment 1, happy or sad subjects were exposed 
to a counter-attitudinal communication that presented strong or 
w e a k  arguments and were or were not explicitly instructed to 
focus on the content of the message. Subjects in a bad mood 
were influenced by strong but not by w e a k  arguments under both 
focus conditions. Subjects in a good mood, on the other hand, 
were equally persuaded by strong and by w e a k  arguments, unless 
they were explicitly instructed to focus on the content of the 
message. In the latter case, only strong arguments were 
persuasive, suggesting that being in a b a d  mood or being 
instructed to pay attention to the content of the m e s s a g e  are 
f u n ctionally equivalent. An analysis of subjects' cognitive 
responses revealed a parallel pattern, suggesting that the 
interaction of m o o d  and argument quality is due to the impact 
of moods on subjects' cognitive elaboration of the message. 
Additional analyses revealed that depressive subjects' ( mean 
BDI-score = 18.9) processing of the m e s s a g e s  parallels the 
findings for subjects in an induced b a d  mood. Experi m e n t  2 
r e p l i c a t e d  the findings of the first study and provided an 
experimental test of the hypothesis that subjects' m o o d  state 
affects message elaboration. Specifically, w o r king on a 
d i s t r a c t o r  task during exposure to the message elimin a t e d  the 
advantage of strong over weak arguments under bad m o o d
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conditions. Subj-ects in a good mood, on the other hand, were ’ 
not affected b y  a distracting task, s uggesting that they did 
not use a central route of persuasion to begin with. We 
conclude that subjects' m o o d s  affect their processing strategy 
and that subjects in a good mood are less likely to engage in 
message elaboration than subjects in a b a d  mood.
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Happy and M i n d l e s s  ?
Moods and the Processing of P ersuasive Communications
Attempts to persuade another person are often accompanied by 
efforts to change the other's mood state. In advertising, 
political campaigns, and informal social encounters, efforts to 
make the recipient feel good often precede the actual persuasion 
attempt. The frequent use of this persuasion strategy, and 
practitioners' faith in it, suggest that it m a y  actually be 
effective. However, the exact m echanisms by w h i c h  recipients' 
affective states mediate persuasion processes are not yet 
u n d e r s t o o d .
In the present paper, we explore the impact of h a p p y  and sad 
moods on the processing of c o u n t e r a t t i t u d i n a 1 communications in 
the context of a cognitive response approach to p ersuasion and 
attitude change ( Petty, Ostrom, &  Brock, 1981). A c c o rding to 
Petty and Cacioppo's (1906 a, b) e laboration likelihood model of 
persuasion, recipients of a persuasive communication m a y  either 
elaborate the content of the message ("central route to 
persuasion") or m a y  rely upon simple cues, that are u n r e lated to 
the message's content, such as the communicator's prestige or 
likeableness ("peripheral route of persuasion"). If a central 
route of persuasion is traveled, the resulting attitude change is 
a function of the recipients' cognitive responses to the message.- 
The more thoughts come to mind that support the posit i o n  
advocated in the message, the more pronounced the intended 
attitude change will be. Accordingly, messages that present 
strong arguments are more effective t h a n  messages that present
weak or flawed arguments. The quality of the message affects 
attitude change less, however, if the peripheral route is 
traveled, because message elaboration is minimized.
Which "route to persuasion" is more likely to be used 
depends on r e c i p i e n t s’ motivation and ability. If the recipient 
is sufficiently motivated and able to process the content of the 
message, the "central route" is likely to predominate. The 
"peripheral route", on the other hand, is likely to be used if 
motiva t i o n  and / or ability are low.
This general framework suggests at least, five ways in which 
m oods m a y  influence persuasion processes (for a d i s c u s s i o n  of 
additional hypotheses see Petty, Cacioppo, &. Kasmer, 1988) . Each 
of these possibilities has different implications for r e c i p i e n t s’ 
attitude change, their cognitive responses to the message, and 
their evaluation of and memory for the presented arguments, as 
outlined below.
M o o d  as a Peripheral Cue Hypothesis
Recipients' affective state may itself serve as a peripheral 
cue if it becomes associated with the attitude object or with the 
source. This prediction is suggested by learning theory 
approaches to attitude change (Berkowitz &. Knurek, 1969; Razran, 
1940; Staats & Staats, 1957, 1958; Staats, Staats, St Crawford, 
1962; Zanna, Kiesler, & Pilkonis, 1970), as well as by the 
hypothesis that affective states may serve informative functions. 
According to the latter hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1988), 
individuals m a y  use their mood at the time of judgment as an 
informational basis according to a "How do I feel about it? " -
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heuristic. That is, they may mistake their p r e-existing mood 
state as a reaction to the message, which may result in greater 
persuasion under good than under bad mood. Both the learning 
t heory and the "mood-as-information" variant of the hypothesis 
that moods may serve as peripheral cues imply that m o o d  effects 
on attitude change should primarily be obtained if a peripheral 
r oute to persuasion is traveled, but should be weak if a central 
route is traveled. Accordingly, they predict a main effect of 
m o o d  on attitude change but no effect of mood on message related 
cognitive responses or recall.
C hange in Criteria Hypothesis
Second, subjects' affective state m a y  influence the criteria 
that they use to evaluate the quality of the message. 
Specifically, it seems plausible to suppose that subjects in a 
bad m o o d  m a y  use harsher criteria to evaluate a persuasive 
m e s s a g e  than subjects in a good mood. If so, subjects in a bad 
m o o d  should evaluate the message less favorably and should show 
less attitude change than subjects in a good mood. This would 
imply a main effect of mood on both attitude change and the 
relative number of supportive and refutational cognitive 
r e s p o n s e s .
Motivational Hypotheses
Third, recipients' affective state m a y  influence their 
m o t i v a t i o n  to,elaborate the content of the message. Isen and 
colleagues ( Isen & Levin, 1972; Isen, Means, Patrick, & N o w i c k i , 
1982; Isen, 1984) suggested that individuals in a good m o o d  may
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avoid cognitive effort that could interfere w i t h  their ability to 
ma i n t a i n  their pleasant affective state. If so, persons in a good 
mood m a y  be unlikely to elaborate the message.
The effects of bad moods, however, are more difficult to 
predict. On the one hand, research on coping with bad moods 
(e.g., Rosenbaum, 1984) suggests that individuals in a bad mood 
m a y  be m o t i v a t e d  to distract themselves from unpleasant thoughts, 
and m a y  thus be particularly likely to engage in other activities 
that are irrelevant to the factors that produced their bad mood. 
Thus, they m a y  concentrate on the message and elaborate its 
content. On the other hand, depressed moods have also been found 
to go along with decreased motivation (e.g.. Beck, 1967; P e t erson
& Seligman, 1984) and m a y  thus decrease the likelihood of message 
elaboration.
Cognitive Capacity Hypotheses
Affective states m a y  influence recipients' ability to 
elaborate the message in various ways. First, the presence of 
m o o d  r e lated thoughts m a y  decrease subjects' information 
processing capacity and m a y  thus interfere with their ability to 
think critically about the message. However, it is unclear 
w h e t h e r  good moods or bad moods are more likely to have this 
interference effect. On the one hand, Isen et a l . (1982) 
suggested that good moods are likely to limit cognitive capacity 
because individuals m a y  think positive thoughts to maintain their 
good mood. On the other hand, bad moods m a y  be more likely t° 
stimulate a search for explanations of w h y  they exist (Abele, 
1985; Schwarz, 1987; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and this should also
A
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interfere w i t h  the performance of other tasks. Moreover, 
affective states m a y  influence an i n d i v i d u a l’s arousal level, 
w h i c h  in turn has been shown to have curvilinear effects on 
cognitive capacity (Kahneman, 1970). Because this latter 
possibility pertains to the intensity rather than the valence of 
affective states, it will not be considered in detail.
In addition, it has been hypot h e s i z e d  that moods m a y  affect 
individuals' preferred processing style, and that persons in a 
good mood are more likely to engage in intuitive-holistic 
processing w h i l e  persons in a bad m o o d  m a y  prefer sequential- 
analytic processing (Isen et a l ., 1982; Kuhl, 1983; Schwarz, 
1987). If so, analytic elaborations of the quality of persuasive 
arguments may be more likely under bad than under good moods.
Thus, the v a rious motivation as well as ability hypotheses 
predict that recipients' affective states will influence which 
processing strategy they choose, though the exact nature of thei 
choice remains unclear. Accordingly, these hypotheses predict 
interaction effects of mood and quality of the presented 
arguments on b o t h  attitude change and cognitive responses.
M o o d  Congruency Hypothesis
Finally, recipients' mood states m a y  influence the 
associations g e n e r a t e d  during exposure to the message, due to 
m o o d  congruent accessibility of material in m e mory (Bower, 1981; 
Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978). This may result in more 
positive elaborations and / or more positive reactions to 
peripheral cues, and accordingly g r e ater persuasion, under good 
than under bad m o o d s .
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A v a i l a b l e  Evidence
The currently available evidence b e a r i n g  on m o o d  effects on 
persuasion is very limited. Worth and M ackie (1987), found that 
subjects who were in an experimentally induced good mood were 
less influenced by the quality of m e s s a g e  arguments than were 
subjects whose mood was not manipulated. T h e i r  data suggest that 
this effect m a y  be m e d i a t e d  by differences in the elaboration of 
the message, because similar patterns emerged for measures of 
attitude change and cognitive responses. Thus, their results are 
compatible with the hypothesis that good moods reduce the 
likelihood that a central route to p ersuasion predominates, 
either due to a lack of motivation or due to a lack of ability.
Unfortunately, the results of the good m o o d  conditions are 
open to alternative interpretations. Most importantly, good mood 
was induced by an unexpe c t e d  pleasant event. Specifically, good 
m o o d  subjects found a d ollar note that they ostensibly had won in 
a lottery while neutral m o o d  subjects were not exposed to an 
un e x p e c t e d  event. Unexpe c t e d  events, however, have been shown to 
instigate causal reasoning (e.g., Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985), 
and thinking about the pleasant surprise, rather than being in a 
good m o o d  per se, may have interfered w i t h  the elaboration of the 
m e s s a g e .
In addition, subjects in the W orth and M a c k i e  (1987) study 
were instructed to imagine a delegate delive r i n g  a speech and to 
evaluate his performance. This instruction m a y  focus subjects' 
attention on aspects other than the content of the message (e.g.,*
h o w  arguments are organized and p r e s e n t e d ) , and m a y  thus increase
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the likeTihood of a peripheral processing strategy to begin with. 
In contrast, if a central processing strategy were adopted, mood 
effects may be limited or absent. Therefore it seems necessary to 
test if mood effects are restricted to situations in w h i c h  
recipients' attention is not focused on the content of the 
message or if they are also obtained w h e n  recipients' are 
explicitly instructed to pay attention to the p r e s ented 
a r g u m e n t s .
Experiment 1 was designed to explore the relative impact of 
good and bad moods on r e c i p i e n t s’ processing of persuasive 
communications that present strong or weak arguments under 
conditions that either do or do not focus their attention on the 
content of the message. To induce a good or bad mood, subjects 
provided a vivid report of a pleasant or an unpleasant life- 
e v e n t . As part of a purportedly independent second study, they 
were subsequently exposed to a tape recorded c o m munication that 
p resented either strong or weak arguments in favor of an increase 
in student services fees. Half of the subjects w e r e  asked to pay 
attention to the quality of the information provided. In 
contrast, the others were told that the study was concerned with 
language comprehension, focusing their attention on paraverbal 
aspects of the communication. Finally, subjects' attitudes toward 
an increase in student services fees, their cognitive responses 
to the message, their m e m o r y  for the message's content, and their 
evaluation of the message were assessed.
According to the hypothesis that one's affective., state may. 
itself serve as a peripheral cue, subjects in a good m o o d  should 
be more persuaded than subjects in a bad mood independently of
*0
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the quality of the arguments. Moreover, the impact of mood on 
attitude change should not be mediated by differences in 
cognitive responses to the content of the message, according to 
this hypothesis, because the impact of m o o d  is presumably v i a  the 
peripheral route of persuasion.
A c c o rding to the various motivation and ability hypotheses, 
subjects' m o o d  m a y  determine their p rocessing mode. If so, the 
obtained attitude change should be m e d iated by differences in 
cognitive responses. Thus, strong arguments should be more 
persuasive, and weak arguments should be less persuasive if a 
central r a t h e r  than a peripheral route is traveled, resulting in 
interaction effects of m o o d  and quality of the arguments. 
Moreover, the degree of attitude change s h o u l d  be more strongly 
related to subjects' cognitive responses under central than under 
peripheral processing strategies. However, the various hypotheses 
make different predictions as to which m o o d  will elicit w h i c h  
strategy, though the W o r t h  and Mackie (1987) findings suggest 
that subjects in a good m o o d  m a y  be less likely to use a central 
processing strategy than subjects in a bad mood.
The m o o d  congruent m e m o r y  hypothesis, on the other hand, 
predicts that subjects in a good mood will generate more 
favorable cognitive responses than subjects in a bad mood. This 
should occur independently of the quality of the arguments, 
r e s u lting in more positive attitude change under good than under 
bad m o o d  in response to both strong and w e a k  arguments. Moreover, 
the degree of attitude change should be closely related to the 
number and valence of cognitive responses. This implication 
allows the m o o d  congruency hypothesis to be d i s t inguished from
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the mood as peripheral 'cue hypothesis, that predicts the same 
pattern for attitude change but not for cognitive responses.
Finally, if subjects in a bad m o o d  use h a rsher criteria to 
evaluate the q u a l i t y  of a message, this should be reflected in 
m o r e  negative ratings of the quality of strong as well as of weak 
messages, which m a y  or may not be independent of the specific 
cognitive responses generated.
Experiment 1
M e t h o d
Subjects and Design
07 non-depressive female students (BDI scores less than 12, 
M e d i a n  = 4; assessed one week before Experiment 1) of the 
U n i v e r s i t y  of Heidelberg, West Germany, with a mean age of 22.3 
years, were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (positive 
vs. negative mood) x 2 (focus of attention on content vs. on 
language) x 2 (strong vs. weak arguments) - factorial between 
subjects design or to a nonfactorial control group. N  per cell 
ranged from 9 to 11. Subjects r e c e i v e d  D M  10 (approx. $ 5 at the 
exchange rate of the time) for their collaboration.
Procedure
Overview
Subjects w e r e  run in groups of 3 to 6, and were seated at 
separate tables to minimize interaction. They were told in 
advance that they w e r e  to participate in two independent studies, 
first a study on personality, part of w h i c h  w o u l d  be the
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construction of a life-event inventory. This first study was 
introduced as the experimenter's d i ploma thesis. The experimenter 
indicated that after completion of the first study, he w o u l d  like 
subjects to listen to a tape recording and s u b sequently answer 
some questions. This ostensible "second study" was introduced as 
part of a research project at another u n i v e r s i t y  in the 
H eidel b e r g  area that the experimenter was w o r k i n g  for. Nothing 
was m e n t i o n e d  about the specific content or purpose of that 
second study. Actually, the "first study" contained the mood 
manipulation, and in the "second study" the persuasive message 
was presented and dependent variables were assessed.
Independent Variables 
H a p p y  or sad moods were induced by procedures similar to 
those employed by Schwarz and Clore (1983) and Strack, Schwarz, 
and Gschneidinger (1985). Subjects were asked to provide a vivid 
and detailed written report of a h a p p y  or a sad life-event, 
p urportedly to help with the construction of a "Heidelberg Life 
Event Inventory", that w o u l d  make use of the reported events.
This cover story has been found to s u c c e s s f u l l y  disguise the m o o d  
induction nature of the task (see Schwarz, 1987, for a 
d i s c u s s i o n ) . Subjects w e r e  given 15 minutes to do so and were 
encouraged to re-live the event in their m ind's eye.
A fter completion of this task, subjects were thanked and 
were introduced to the apparent second study, that was 
p u rportedly being conducted in collaboration w i t h  researchers at 
another university. Subjects were first given a "Participants 
Questionnaire", printed on the letterhead of another university.
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that assessed their academic major and related general 
information. Embedded in this questionnaire was a manipu l a t i o n  
check that read, "How do you feel right now, at this very 
moment?" (1 = very bad; 9 = very g o o d ) .
After completion of the P a rticipants Questionnaire, the 
s econd study was either introduced as an experiment on the 
evaluation of arguments (arguments focus c o n d i t i o n ) , or as an 
experiment on language comprehension (language focus c o n d i t i o n ) .
Subsequently, subjects listened to a tape recorded 
communication that announced an increase in student services fees 
from D M  45 (approximately $ 22.50) to D M  65 (approximately $32.50 
at the exchange rate of the time) per semester, to take effect 
w i t h  the beginning of the following academic year at s u b j e c t s’ 
university. This increase was either j u s t i f i e d  with eleven strong 
arguments or with eleven weak a r g u m e n t s . B o t h  m e s sages were of 
approximately equal length. Though the increase of D M  20.00 seems 
r ather small, it should be noted that the last actual fee 
increase of D M  11.00 in 1902 caused m a s s i v e  student protests and 
boycott activities.
Pretest data based on 18 s u b jects indicated a reliable 
d ifference in the perceived quality of the arguments, M  = 6.6 for 
the strong and 4.3 for the weak arguments on a 9-point scale, 
t(16) = 2.77, £  < .02 (Note 1) . No differ e n c e s  in 
comprehensibility of the message or likeability of the 
communicator emerged, all t ’s < 1.
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Dependent Variables
A t t i t u d e s . After exposure to the message, subjects reported 
their approval of an increase in student services fees along a 
rating scale from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 9 (strongly approve). 
Subsequently, they were asked to indicate the fee that they w o u l d  
consider appropriate.
Message evaluation and cognitive r e s p o n s e s . Following the 
attitude measures, subjects evaluated the s t r ength of the 
presented arguments along a scale from 1 (not s t r o n g  at all) to 9 
(very s t r o n g ) . Then, they were instucted to list w i t h i n  three 
minutes "all thoughts that had come to m i n d  w h i l e  listening to 
the tape recording, no matter if they s e e m  important or 
unimportant to you." Subjects were provided a sheet with ten 
boxes and were instructed to list only one thought per box. It 
was pointed out that they were not r e q uired to use all boxes.
After completion of this task, they m a r k e d  each thought as 
" f a v o r a b l e 11 (i.e., supporting the suggested increase), 
"unfavorable" (i.e., opposing an increase), or "neutral" (i.e., 
unrelated to the issue), following similar procedures used in 
other studies (Petty, Harkins & Cacioppo, 1981; c f . Petty,
Ostrom, &. Brock, 1981; Greenwald, 1968) .
M e m o r y . Finally, subjects' m e m o r y  for the presented 
arguments was assessed. They were given a surprise recall test 
and w r o t e  down all arguments they could remember. Subsequently, 
they received a recognition test and indicated w h i c h  of 30 
arguments they had actually heard. The r e c o g n i t i o n  list consisted 
of the eleven strong and eleven weak arguments plus eight 
additional statements. Thus, there w e r e  eleven previously
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presented arguments and 19 foils for each slibject. Subjects were 
given 3 minutes for each of these tasks.
Control Group
Subjects of the non-factorial control group w e r e  neither 
exposed to a mood manipulation nor to a persuasive communication. 
T h e y  were only informed of the intended increase in student 
services fees and reported their attitudes toward this increase. 
No other dependent variables were assessed.
After completion of the above procedures, all subjects were 
thoroughly debriefed and dismissed.
Results
Mood
As expected, subjects who had to describe a h a p p y  event 
repor t e d  being in a better mood (M = 7.0) than subjects who 
described a sad event CM = 6.1), F (1,70) = 5 . 0 1 ,  £  < .03. This 
indicates that the m o o d  manipulation was successful. No other 
significant effects emerged, all F ’s < 1. Thus, the impact of 
the m o o d  manipu l a t i o n  was not dependent on subjects' focus of 
attention or the strength of the arguments they heard.
Attitude Change
Both attitude questions were analyzed by a 2 (mood) x 
2(focus) x 2(quality of arguments) M A N O V A  (all m u l t i v a r i a t e  F- 
ratios are based on Wilk's lambda). Because u nivariate analyses 
indicated the same results for each of the dependent variables.
A
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only the multivariate tests are reported. The me'ans of both 
variables are shown in Table 1 as a function of the experimental 
m a n i p u l a t i o n s .
A
Table 1 about here
Subjects who were exposed to strong arguments reported more 
positive attitudes toward an increase in student services fees 
than subjects who were exposed to weak arguments, multivariate 
F(2,58) = 5.65, £  < .01 (Note 2). This main effect was qualified 
by a significant interaction of argument quality and mood, 
m u ltivariate F(2,58) = 5.26, £  < .01.
As shown in Figure 1, only subjects in a b a d  m o o d  but not 
subjects in a good m o o d  were differentially affected by strong 
and w e a k  arguments. Specifically, subjects in a bad mood reported 
a h i g h e r  approval of the intended increase, and suggested a 
h i g h e r  fee as appropriate, when they were exposed to strong 
rather than to weak arguments; multivariate F(2, 62) = 8.58, £  < 
.001, for the simple m a i n  effec t. Subjects in a good mood, on 
the other hand, were equally affected by strong and weak 
arguments, multivariate F < 1.
Figure 1 about here
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In addition, a significant interaction of argiiment quality 
and focus of attention emerged, multiv a r i a t e  F(2,58) = 4.66, £  < 
.02, that was independent of the m o o d  manipulation. As shown in 
Figure 2, strong arguments were more influential than weak 
arguments when subjects were instructed to focus on the quality 
of the presented information; m u ltivariate F(2,62) = 8.17, £  < 
.001 for the simple main effect. W h e n  subjects w e r e  given a 
language comprehension set, on the other hand, argument quality 
did not exert a significant influence, m u ltivariate F < 1.
Figure 2 about here
Finally, the means of all experimental conditions were 
compared to the mean of the nonfactorial control group by planned 
comparisons. The results of these tests, shown by subscripts in 
Table 1, indicate that strong but not weak arguments resulted in 
significant attitude change when subjects were in a bad mood, 
independent of the focus of attention manipulation. Subjects in a 
good mood, on the other hand, were influenced b y  strong arguments 
but not by weak arguments when they were explicitly instructed to 
evaluate the quality of the arguments. Without this explicit 
instruction, good m o o d  subjects were equally influenced by strong 
as well as by weak arguments, though this pattern did not result 
in a significant triple interaction. Thus, being in a bad mood 
seemed functionally equivalent to b e i n g  instructed to focus on 
the quality of the presented arguments, and either of these 
m a n ipulations r e s u l t e d  in a differential impact of strong and
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w e a k  arguments.
Let us now consider the implications of these findings for 
the previously discussed hypotheses. Most importantly, the 
obtained interaction of m o o d  and argument quality is incompatible 
with hypotheses that predict a main effect of mood, w h i c h  w a s  not 
obtained. Thus, it seems unlikely that subjects based their 
evaluation of the issue on their affective state at the time of 
judgment, or that the impact of mood was m e d i a t e d  by more 
favorable associations under good than under b a d  mood. This rules 
out the "mood - a s - p e r i p h e r a l - c u e’1 - and the "mood congruency"- 
hypotheses as viable explanations for the obtained results. 
Obviously, the failure to obtain support for these hypotheses 
does not imply that the respective processes m a y  never influence 
the impact of persuasive messages. For example, it is conceivable 
that mood-as-per i p h e r a 1 - c u e  effects m a y  be o b t a i n e d  if one's 
affective state seems m o r e  relevant to the content of the m e s s a g e  
and/or if message e laboration occurs on a more superficial level. 
The current results, however, are incompatible w i t h  these 
h y p o t h e s e s .
Rather, the findings presented so far suggest that subjects 
in a bad m o o d  were more likely to elaborate the content of the 
message than subjects in a good mood, r e s u lting in a greater 
impact of strong r a t h e r  than weak arguments under bad mood. If 
so, subjects' cognitive responses should parallel the pattern of 
the attitude data.
Alternatively, subjects in a bad m o o d  m a y  have used harsher 
criteria to evaluate the quality of the message than subjects in 
a good mood. We will n o w  turn to data that bear on these
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p o s s i b i 1i t i e s .
Perceived Argument Quality
As expected, subjects rated the strong arguments as s t r o n g e r  
(M ■= 6.0) than the weak arguments CM = 3.5), F(l,70) = 27.48, £  < 
.0005. However, their evaluation of the arguments was neithier 
affected by their m o o d  nor by the induced focus of attention, all 
F 's < 1. Thus, the hypothesis that subjects in a good m o o d  m a y  
have used more lenient criteria to evaluate the q u ality of the 
message received no support.
Cognitive Responses
The average number of thoughts that subjects r e p o r t e d  in the 
thought listing task CM » 5.6, s = 1.89) was not s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
affected by the experimental manipulations, all £  > .25.
However, separate analyses of the proportions of favorable 
and unfavorable thoughts, shown in Table 2, revealed systematic
Table 2 about here
differences. Overall, subjects reported a higher p r o p o r t i o n  of 
favorable thoughts (M = .25) and a lower proportion of 
unfavorable thoughts (M =.43) in response to strong r a t h e r  than 
w e a k  arguments (M 1s = .14 and .53, r e s p .), F 's (1,70) = 7.50 and 
3.30, p 's <.01 and .08, resp. Again, this conclusion is qualified 
by significant interactions of argument quality and mood,
F 's (1,70) = 8.65 and 2.76, p 's < .005 and .11, for proportions of 
favorable and unfavorable thoughts, resp.
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As shown in Figure 3, the effect of argument quality is 
exclusively due to the cognitive responses of subjects in a bad 
mood. These subjects generated a h igher proportion of favorable 
and a lower proportion of unfavorable thoughts in response to the 
strong arguments than in response to the weak arguments, t 's (70)
= 3.96 and 2.43, p *s < .0005 and .003, r e s p ., reflecting a high 
degree of systematic elaboration of the message. The cognitive 
responses generated by subjects in a good mood, on the other 
hand, did not vary as a function of message quality, t 's < 1, 
suggesting that the occurence of favorable and unfavorable 
thoughts under good m o o d  was independent of the content of the 
m e s s a g e .
1
Figure 3 about here
No other significant effects emerged either for the 
proportion of favorable or for the proportion of unfavorable 
thoughts, all F < 1. Nor did the proportion of neutral thoughts 
show any impact of the experimental manipulations.
In combination with the attitude data, these findings 
clearly support the hypothesis that the impact of mood on 
persuasion is mediated by its impact on the choice of processing 
strategies. While subjects in a bad m o o d  elaborated the content 
of the message according to a central route of persuasion, 
subjects in a good mood d i d  not do so.
Recall and Recognition Data
Subjects' free recall data were categorized by two
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independent judges as either "correct" or "false". Judges agreed 
on 97% of the individual listings, and the disagreements were 
resolved by discussion. The mean n u m b e r  of recalled arguments w a s
6.7 (out of 11), and was not affected b y  the experimental 
manipulations, all F < 1.
To analyze subjects' recognition data, the difference 
between hits and false alarms was computed (Murdock, 1982). With 
11 target items and 19 foils, the difference score could range 
from -19 to + 11. The mean difference score over all conditions 
was 8.5, and subjects showed a b etter recognition of weak (M = 
9.0) than strong arguments (M = 8.0), F(l,70) = 5.83, £  < .02.
No other effects emerged.
In summary, there is no evidence that w o u l d  suggest that 
subjects' mood or focus of attention affected their m e m o r y  for 
the arguments.
Discussion
In combination, the findings of Experiment 1 suggest that 
recipients' moods affect their proces s i n g  modes. Specifically, 
subjects in a good mood seem less likely to elaborate the 
presented arguments than subjects in a bad mood. Accordingly, 
subjects in a bad m o o d  generated a h i g h e r  proportion of favorable 
cognitive responses, and showed more attitude change, when 
exposed to a message that presented strong arguments than when 
exposed to a message that presented w e a k  arguments. Subjects in a 
good mood, on the other hand, were not d i f f erentially influenced 
by strong or weak arguments in e i t h e r  their cognitive responses 
or their attitude change, unless they were explicitly instructed
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to focus on the quality of the message. This pattern of findings 
suggests that subjects in a bad mood proceeded via a central 
processing route, w h i c h  was only used by subjects in a good m o o d  
if they were explicitly instructed to do so.
Additional Comparisons
Although the presented data revealed a significant 
difference between the reported mood of good vs. bad mood 
subjects, subjects assigned to the bad m o o d  conditons still 
scored above the scale midpoint. One might therefore argue that 
these subjects were in a "neutral11 rather than in a pronounced 
bad mood. Unfortunately, however, it is rather difficult to 
d etermine which scale value reflects a “neutral" as opposed to a 
"positive" or a “negative" mood state. This difficulty is due to 
conceptual problems associated w i t h  the idea of a "neutral" mood.
Frequently, researchers use the term "neutral mood" to r efer 
to subjects' non-manipulated mood state. In practice, this 
p rocedure implies that the exact nature of the presumed "neutral" 
m o o d  is determined by extraneous variables such as the weather 
(e.g., Cunningham, 1979; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, E x p . 2) or other 
salient events of the day ( e.g., Schwarz, Strack, Kommer & 
Wagner, 1987). Accordingly, the outcome of experimental 
comparisons that are based on this logic is a function of 
fortuitous influences that determine the mood state of subjects 
w h o  are assigned to the no-manipulation conditions.
Alternatively, one might define a "neutral" mood as the m o o d  
state -that is reflected by values in the middle range of a mood 
scale. It is well known, however, that non-manipulated moods tend
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to be somewhat elevated. In fact, most of the time, most people 
report being in a good mood (Bless &  Schwarz, 1984; Mat 1 in & 
Stang, 1978; Sommers, 1984). Accordingly, values in the middle 
range of a m o o d  scale m a y  already reflect the subjective 
experience of a negative deviation f r o m  o n e’s usual mood, and it 
ma y  be difficult to induce more pronounced bad moods w i t h i n  the 
ethical constraints of experimental research.
In summary, determining "how bad" subjects' m o o d  in 
Experiment 1 really was, turns out to be difficult. T o  avoid 
some of these conceptual problems, the data from the previously 
presented bad mood conditions will be compared w i t h  concurrently 
collected data from depressed individuals who are habitually in a 
negative m o o d  state (Beck, 1967). Specifically, only subjects who 
scored less or equal 12 on Beck's D e p r e s s i o n  Inventory were run 
in the reported experimental conditions, and were assigned to the 
various m o o d  manipulations. Subjects w h o  scored above 12 on the 
BDI were not exposed to a mood manipulation, thus providing a 
control group that is habitually in a bad mood. Due to the 
limited number of depressive subjects, only the previously 
described language focus instructions could be replicated.
The BDI scores of the depressive subjects were significantly 
greater (M = 18.9) than those of the non-depresgive subjects (M = 
5.8), F (1,34) = 70.40, £  < .0005, all other F's < 1. The results 
are summarized in Table 3. They suggest that subjects in a 
naturally depressed mood as well as subjects in an experimentally 
induced bad mood, engaged in systematic message elaboration. Most 
importantly, the source of subjects' bad m o o d  did not result in 
any significant main effect or interaction on the measures of
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attitude change, argument rating, or cognitive response, all p 's 
> 20.
Table 3 about here
In combination, the findings f r o m  d e p r e s s e d  subjects provide 
further support for the hypothesis that persons who are in a bad 
mood, either habitually or due to situational influences, tend to 
elaborate persuasive messages systematically. Most importantly, 
the absence of any significant d ifferences between naturally 
depressed subjects and non-depressed subjects in an induced bad 
mood suggests that the bad mood induction was successful and 
renders it unlikely that a stronger ( and ethically acceptable) 
m o o d  induction may produce dramatic changes in the results.
In summary, the findings reported so far suggest that the 
impact of moods on persuasion is m e d i a t e d  by their impact on 
subjects' processing mode. However, the available evidence is 
purely correlational. Therefore, an experimental test of the 
hypothesized mediating role of cognitive responses is called for.
Experiment 2
If the obtained interaction of m o o d  and message quality on 
attitude change is m e d i a t e d  by the impact of moods on subjects' 
cognitive responses, this interaction s h o u l d  be affected by other 
variables that are k n o w n  to influence m e s s a g e  elaboration. 
According to the elaboration likelihood model, the amount of
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message elaboration is determined b y  the recipient's motiv a t i o n  
and ability to process the message, and variables like 
distraction, personal relevance, repetition, prior knowlege etc. 
can decrease or increase message e laboration (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986 a, b ) . Most importantly, distraction has been shown to 
interfere with the systematic processing of a message. D istracted 
subjects are less likely to generate favorable cognitive 
responses in reaction to strong arguments or negative cognitive 
responses in reaction to weak arguments. As a consequence, 
distraction reduces the differential impact of strong and weak 
messages ( c f . Petty & Brock, 1981) .
Accordingly, one can test the hypoth e s i s  that the impact of 
mood on persuasion is mediated by its impact on subjects' 
cognitive responses by introducing a d istraction manipulation. If 
subjects in a bad m o o d  are likely to elaborate the message, while 
subjects in a good mood are less likely to do so, introducing a 
distraction manip u l a t i o n  should eliminate the m o o d  effects 
obtained in Experiment 1. To test this hypothesis, subjects' in a 
good or bad m o o d  were exposed to strong or weak arguments and 
were or were not distracted during exposure.
M ethod
Subjects and Design
75 female students of the U n i v e r s i t y  of Heidelberg, with a 
mean age of 22.4 years, were randomly assigned to the conditions 
of a 2 (positive vs. negative mood) x 2 (strong vs. weak 
arguments) x  2 (no distraction vs. distraction) - factorial 
design. N  per cell ranged from 8 to 11. Subjects received DM 8
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■(approx. $ 4) for their collaboration.
Procedure
Except for the distraction conditions described below, the 
procedure, the independent, and the dependent variables were 
identical to the language focus condition of Experiment 1. 
However, no free recall and recognition data were collected, 
g iven that these variables showed no effect in Experiment 1.
Distraction M a n i p u l a t i o n . Subjects assigned-to the 
d i s t r a c t i o n  conditions were presented eleven slides with simple 
c omputation tasks during exposure to the tape. They had to solve 
these tasks, e.g., 5 + 4 - 2 = ? ,  and write down the answer on a 
s o l ution sheet. F o l l owing procedures used by Zimbardo et al. 
(1970), subjects were told that their m a i n  task was to listen to 
the tape.
The pace of the slide presentation, of 11.3 seconds per 
task, was pretested to ensure that the computation tasks required 
a certain degree of cognitive capacity, but that subjects were 
still able to listen to the tape. 36 of the 38 subjects assigned 
to the disctraction conditions solved all tasks correctly, and 
two subjects provided one incorrect solution.
R e s ults
M o o d
Subjects who had to describe a positive 1 ife-event reported 
being in a better m o o d  (M ='6.3) than subjects w h o  h a d  to 
describe a negative life-event (M = 5.4), F(l,67) ■= 4.18, p<.04; 
all other F's < 1. Thus, as in Experiment 1, the mood
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m a n ipulation was sucessful 'and did not interact w i t h  other 
independent variables.
Attitude chancre
As in Experiment i, the influence of the persuasive 
communication was inferred from the recipients' approval of the 
suggested fee increase and the amount of increase they 
recommended, and multivariate analyses were computed. Both 
indices are shown in Table 4 as a function of s t r ength of 
arguments, subjects' induced mood, and distraction.
Table 4 about here
A specified triple interaction w a s  predicted for this 
experiment, and this prediciton was tested b y  a f o cused 
multivariate a priori contrast r a t h e r  than an omnibus F-test, 
following suggestions by Rosenthal & R osnow (1985). The contrast 
weights are given in the top rows of Table 4. The result of this 
analysis confirms the predicted triple interaction, F(2,61) = 
3.02, £  < .06. Diagnosis of this interaction indicates, that the 
quality of the message affected non-di s t r a c t e d  subjects when they 
were in a bad m o o d  , F(2,61) = 4 . 2 1 ,  £  < .02, but not w h e n  they 
were in a good mood, F < 1, resulting in a n o n s i gnificant simple 
interaction of mood and argument quality, F(2,61) = 2.28, £  <
.12. Additional univariate tests revealed a s i gnificant simple 
interaction for the "approval"- measure, F(l,67) ■= 4.29, £  < .05, 
but not for the "amount of money" measure, F(l,62) = 2.14, £
<.12. Overall, this pattern of results replicates the findings of
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E xperiment 1.
Distracted subjects, on the other hand, were not 
d i f f erentially affected by strong or weak arguments under either 
good or bad mood conditions, both F 's < 1. Accordingly, no simple 
interaction of mood and argument quality emerged under 
d i s t r a c t i o n  conditions, F < 1.
In summary, either being in a good m o o d  or being distracted 
e liminated the advantage of strong over weak arguments. Moreover, 
no effect of mood on attitude change w a s  obtained under 
d i s t r a c t i o n  conditions, as suggested b y  the hypothesis that the 
impact of mood on attitude change is m e d i a t e d  by its impact on 
subjects' cognitive responses.
P e r c e i v e d  quality
As expected, subjects rated strong arguments as stronger (M 
= 5.58) than weak arguments (M = 3.86), F(l,67) = 11.75, £  <.001. 
The e valuation of the arguments was neither affected by mood, nor 
by the distraction tasks, all p 's >.10. This indicates, that all 
subjects, including the distracted ones, recognized the 
difference in argument quality. Thus, the pattern of the attitude 
results can not be explained by differential evaluations of the 
q u ality of the arguments.
Cognitive responses
Overall, non-distracted subjects reported more thoughts in 
the thought listing task (M = 5.24) than d istracted subjects (M = 
4.83), F (1,67) = 5.02, £  <.03, indicating that the distraction 
m a n i p u l a t i o n  was successful in reducing the total number of
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cognitive responses. No other significant effects on the t o t a l  
number of reported thoughts emerged.
Separate analyses of the proportion of favorable and 
unfavorable thoughts, presented in Table 5, indicated that non­
distracted subjects generated a smaller proportion of f a v o r a b l e  
thoughts (M = .17) and a higher proportion of unfavorable 
thoughts (M = .43) in response to the counterattitudinal m e s s a g e  
than distracted subjects (M 1 s = .23 and .31, r e s p .) , F_^(l,67) = 
3.02 and 4.10, p 's < .09 and .05, respectively. This f i n d i n g  
f u r t h e r■reflects the success of the d i straction m a n ipulation.
>
Table 5 about here
In addition, m a i n  effects of argument quality on both 
thought measures emerged. Subjects who were exposed to strong 
arguments tended to report a greater proportion of favorable (M 
= .25), and reported a smaller p roportion of u nfavorable thoughts 
(M = .29), than subjects who were exposed to weak arguments (M 1s 
= .18 and .44, resp.), F ' s (1,67) = 2.06 and 6.37, p ‘s <.16 and 
.02, respectively. As in Experiment 1, these m a i n  effects were 
q u a l i f i e d  by interaction effects of m o o d  and argument quality 
that parallel the attitude change data, F ' s (l,67) = 3.15 and 
3.88, p 's <.08 and .06, for the propo r t i o n  of favorable and 
u nfavorable thoughts, respectively.
Specifically, subjects in a bad m o o d  reported a higher 
propo r t i o n  of favorable (M = .31) and a smaller proportion of
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unfavorable thoughts (M = .26) after listening to strong 
arguments than after listening to w e a k  arguments (M ‘ s = .26 and 
.53); F ' s (1,67) = 5.45 and 10.16, p 1 s <.05 and .01, 
respectively, for the simple main effects. In contrast, subjects 
in a good mood were not affected by argument quality, neither in 
the p roportion of favorable (M* s = . 27 v s . .26, for strong and 
we a k  arguments, resp.) nor in the proportion of unfavorable 
thoughts (M's = .33 v s . . 36) that they reported, F ‘s (1,67) < 1 and 
1.74, n.s., respectively, for the simple m a i n  effects. ■
Separate analyses under each d i s t r a c t i o n  condition suggest 
that the interaction effects of mood and argument q u ality are 
primarily due to the behavior of n o n - distracted subjects. 
Specifically, non-distracted subjects in a bad m o o d  r e p orted a 
hi g h e r  proportion of favorable (M ■= .35) and a smaller proportion 
of unfavorable thoughts (M = .29) in r e s ponse to the strong 
ra t h e r  than the weak arguments (M ‘s = .07 and .60, resp.), 
t 's (67) = 2.84 and -2.62, p 's < .01 and .02, respectively. This 
pattern was less pronounced w h e n  bad m o o d  subjects were 
distracted, M ‘ s = .27 and .23, t^  <1, for favorable thoughts in 
response to strong and w e a k  arguments, and M ' s  = .23 and .45, 
¿(67) = —1.86, £  <.07 for unfavorable thoughts.
T h e  cognitive responses reported by subjects in a good.mood, 
on the other hand, were not affected b y  the d i s t r a c t i o n  
manipulation, all t ‘s < 1, again p aralleling the attitude change 
data. Finally, a contrast analysis was computed to test the 
■ si g nificance of the predicted triple interaction, p aralleling the 
analysis of the attitude change data. T h i s  analysis confirmed the 
statistical reliability of the described findings for the
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proportion of favorable thoughts; t(67) = -2.41, £  < .02, but not 
for the proportion of unfavorable thoughts, £  > .10.
In summary, either being d i s t r a c t e d  or being in a good mood 
interfered with subjects' elaboration of the message, as 
predicted by the hypothesis that the effects of m o o d  on attitude 
change are m e d i a t e d  by subjects' cognitive responses.
General Discussion 
M o o d  and M e ssage Elaboration
In combination, the findings of the reported experiments 
indicate that m o o d  affects recipients' processing modes. 
Specifically, subjects in a good m o o d  seem less likely to 
elaborate the presented arguments than subjects in a bad mood. 
Accordingly, subjects in a bad mood generated a h i g h e r  proportion 
of favorable cognitive responses and a smaller proportion of 
unfavorable cognitive responses, and showed more attitude change, 
when exposed to a message that presented strong arguments than 
w h e n  exposed to a message that presented weak arguments. Subjects 
in a good mood, on the other hand, were not differentially 
influenced by strong or weak arguments in either their cognitive 
responses or their attitude change.
Moreover, Experiment 2 provided direct evidence for the 
me d i a t i n g  role of recipients' cognitive responses: W h e n  subjects 
in a bad mood were distracted from processing the content of the 
message, their increased responsiveness to strong rather than 
weak arguments was eliminated, indicating that being in a bad 
mo o d  is associated with systematic message elaboration. Subjects 
in a good mood, on the other hand, were not affected by a
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d i stracting task, suggesting that they did not engage in m e s s a g e  
elaboration to begin with. Thus, either being distracted or- being 
in a good m o o d  reduced recipients' e l aboration of the message, 
suggesting that the two are functionally equivalent.
As a m i r r o r  image to this finding. Experiment 1 also 
d e monstrated that subjects in a good m o o d  did elaborate the 
message if explicitly instructed to do so. Subjects in bad mood, 
on the other hand, also elaborated the m e s s a g e  in absence of 
explicit instructions. Thus, either being instructed to focus on 
the content of the message or being in a b a d  m o o d  resulted in 
message elaboration, again suggesting that the two are 
f u nctionally equivalent.
The findings provided by the current studies are consistent 
w i t h  the results reported by Worth and M ackie (1987), who found 
differential cognitive responses and differential attitude change 
in r e s ponse to strong and weak arguments under non-manipulated 
m oods but not under good moods. Moreover, the differences b e t w e e n  
the present study and the Worth and M ackie study suggest that the 
impact of good mood is rather robust. In the W o r t h  and M ackie 
study, good m o o d  was induced by an u n e x p e c t e d  positive event and 
we s p e c u l a t e d  that this unexpected event m a y  have interfered w i t h  
the elabor a t i o n  of the message. In the present study, good and 
bad moods were induced through the recall of positive or negative 
e xperiences and one may speculate that r e c a l l i n g  negative 
experiences is more likely to trigger rumination, w h i c h  m a y  
interfere w i t h  other cognitive tasks,, than r e c a lling positive 
e xperiences (Abele, 1985; Schwarz, 1987). Nonetheless, subjects 
in a good m o o d  again showed less elaboration of the message than
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subjects in. a bad mood. Thus, it seetas safe to conclude t h a t  good 
moods reduce the likelihood of message elaboration.
Whether bad moods increase the likelihood of m e s s a g e  
elaboration is difficult to evaluate on the basis of the 
available data. However, findings in other domains suggest that 
individuals in a bad mood are more likely to use an a n a l y t i c  and 
piecemeal processing strategy than subjects in a n o n - m a n i p u l a t e d  
mood, while subjects in a good mood are least likely to do so. 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , subjects in an induced bad m o o d  use c o v a r i a t i o n  
information more accurately than subjects in a n o n - m a n i p u l a t e d  
mood, whereas subjects in an induced good mood use it less 
accurately (Schwarz, Kommer, & Lessle, 1987). These findings, 
which parallel research on depressive r e alism (see R u e h l m a n  et 
al., 1985), as well as the results of the d e p r e s s e d  s u b j e c t s  
reported as part of Experiment 1, suggest a close r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between m o o d  state and processing strategy: It seems that the 
likelihood of effortful analytic processing decreases as moods 
become more positive. If so, individuals in a bad m o o d  m a y  be 
more likely to elaborate a message than individuals in a n o n ­
m anipulated mood, in particular because non-m a n i p u l a t e d  moods are 
usually of a somewhat elevated quality, as d i s c u s s e d  above (Bless 
& Schwarz, 1984; Matlin & Stang, 1978; Sommers, 1984) . Clearly, 
future research should attempt to induce good and bad moods at 
several levels of extremity.
What Mediates the Impact of Mood on Proces s i n g  Strategy?
What mediates the impact of mood states on individuals' 
p rocessing strategies is currently unclear. At least three
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p o s s i b i 1ities warrant further investigation.
First, as suggested by Isen and colleagues (1982), 
individuals may be motivated to maintain a good m o o d  and to get 
out of a bad mood. Therefore, individuals in a good mood m a y  
avoid cognitive effort, because effortful r e a s o n i n g  m a y  interfere 
w i t h  their positive mood state. By the same token, individuals in 
a b a d  m o o d  may want to distract themselves f r o m  negative 
thoughts, and m a y  thus be particularly likely to engage in other 
t a s k s .
Second, both good or bad moods m a y  limit cognitive capacity. 
On the one hand, persons in a good m o o d  m a y  elaborate their 
pleasant thoughts. On the other hand, persons in a bad m o o d  may 
analyze the causes of their negative feelings and what to do 
about them. Thus, both good and bad moods m a y  instigate cognitive 
activity that interferes with other tasks, and it will be an 
important task for future research to determine the conditions 
u n d e r  w h i c h  each mood state limits cognitive capacity.
Third, the choice of processing strategies m a y  reflect a 
h i g h l y  adaptive automatic process. Specifically, bad m o o d s  are 
u s u a l l y  associated with situations that a person wants to avoid 
w h ereas good moods are associated with situations a person wants 
to approach. Thus, good and bad moods are closely linked with 
approach and avoidance motivations, respectively. Note, however, 
that approach and avoidance situations require differentially 
elaborate processing strategies. When we want to obtain a certain 
outcome, it is usually sufficient to d e t e rmine one of the 
p o t e n t i a l l y  m a n y  possible ways that lead to the desired outcome. 
W h e n  w e  want to avoid a certain outcome, on the other hand, we
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need to determine all possible causal l'inks that m a y  p r o d u c e  this 
outcome in order to avoid it. Thus, approach and avoidance 
situations show a natural asymmetry in the degree of a n a l y t i c  
reasoning that they require (see Lewicka, 1986 for a r e l a t e d  
a r g u m e n t ) . It is therefore conceivable that bad moods, w h i c h  are 
usually associated w i t h  an avoidance motivation, a u t o m a t i c a l l y  
trigger a more elaborate and analytic processing style t h a n  good 
moods, which are u s u a l l y  associated with approach m o t i v a t i o n s .
None of these processes is m u t u a l l y  exclusive and it w i l l  be 
an important, albeit difficult, task to isolate their r e l a t i v e  
contributions. This task will be further complicated by t h e  
possibility that the cognitive and motivational effects of moods 
may interact w i t h  the nature of the processing tasks. For 
example, recent findings by Isen, Daubman, & Gorgolione (1986) 
suggest that positive moods might improve performance on c r e a t i v e  
tasks, which r e quire unusual associative links to be made. Thus, 
if elated or d e p r e s s e d  moods facilitate or inhibit cognitive 
performance is likely to depend on the nature of the task.
Implications for the E l aboration L i k e l i h o o d  Model
The current findings in c ombination w i t h  the results 
reported by W o r t h  and Mackie (1987) indicate that the impact of 
m o o d  on p e r s u a s i o n  is mediated by its impact on the elaboration 
of message content, rather than b y  any of the other processes we 
speculated about.
Specifically, we found no evidence that recipients' 
affective states served as peripheral cues w h i c h  w o u l d  imply mood 
effects on attitude change that are independent of message
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elaboration. Given the evidence that individuals consult their 
feelings at the time of judgment to simpl i f y  otherwise difficult 
judgmental tasks (Schwarz, in press; Schwarz & Clore, 1988; 
Schwarz, Strack, Kommer, & Wagner, 1987), such peripheral cue 
effects should have been particularly likely to emerge u n d e r  the 
distraction conditions of Experiment 2. This was not the case.
Nor did recipients in a bad mood seem to use h a r s h e r  criteria in 
evaluating the quality of the message, as is reflected in the 
lack of mood effects on ratings of message quality. N e ither do 
the current data support predictions d e r i v e d  f r o m  models of m o o d  
congruent memory (Bower, 1981; Clark & Isen, 1982). A c c o r d i n g  to 
these models, recipients who are in a good m o o d  may generate more 
favorable associations in response to the m e s sage than recipients 
who are in a bad mood, resulting in a m a i n  effect of mood in the 
cognitive response as well as the attitude change data. A main 
effect of mood, however, was not obtained. Rather, m o o d  s h o w e d  a 
significant interaction with message quality and the highest 
proportion of favorable responses was g e n e rated by subjects who 
were in a bad m o o d  and received strong arguments.
In summary, then, recipients' affective state seems to 
mediate the impact of a persuasive message b y  affecting the 
elaboration of the message's content.
What Mediates Focus of Attention Effects?
Finally, we will turn to a somewhat puzzling aspect of the 
results of Experiment 1. Both being in a bad m o o d  and being 
„instructed to focus on the content of the message resulted in 
h i g h e r  attitude change in response to strong arguments. However,
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only being in a bad mood increased subjects’ elaboration of the 
content of the message as reflected in the cognitive r e s p o n s e  
data. Focusing attention on the message's content, on the o t h e r  
hand, did not affect subjects' cognitive responses despite its 
impact on attitude change, nor did it affect subjects' r a t i n g s  of 
the quality of the message or their m e m o r y  for the p r e s e n t e d  
arguments. This suggests that its impact on attitude c hange did 
not occur via the central route of persuasion as the e l a b o r a t i o n  
likelihood model w o u l d  suggest.
To account for these findings, one may speculate that the 
instruction to focus on the quality of the message prompted, 
subjects' to consider their overall evaluation of the m e s s a g e  
w h e n  they reported their attitude. In line with this assumption, 
subjects' ratings of the message's quality were more s t r o n g l y  
correlated w i t h  their reported attitude when they w e r e  instructed 
to focus on the content of the message, r = .91, than when they 
were not, r = .76, though this difference did not reach 
significance, z = 1.0, £  < .08, one-tailed. This suggests that 
the quality of a message m a y  affect its impact independent of 
message elaboration if subjects use their global evalua t i o n  of 
the message as a cue.
M o o d  and Persuasion: Some Advice
In conclusion, putting recipients in a good m o o d  w h e n  we 
want to influence them may not always be a good idea. 
Specifically, w h e n  we have strong arguments to present in favor 
o f .our case, recipients' good m o o d  may reduce their impact by 
interfering w i t h  recipients' e laboration of the message. This
interference is p a r ticularly undesirable because attitude c h a n g e  
via a central route of persuasion has b e e n  found to be m o r e  
stable than attitude change via a peripheral route (cf. P e t t y  & 
Cacioppo, 1986 a,b) . Thus, strong arguments are likely to b e  more 
persuasive w h e n  we d e l i v e r  them to an audience that is in a. 
neutral or slightly depressed mood.
W e a k  arguments, on the other hand, are more effective w h e n  
recipients do not elaborate them. Therefore, if w e  have n o t h i n g  
compelling to say, putting the audience in a good m o o d  may be a 
smart choice —  m u c h  as many advertisers seem to have k n o w n  for 
quite a while.
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Footnotes
Note 1. While the results of "argument quality" ratings w e r e  
used in the present studies as criteria for defining "stro n g "  and 
“weak" versions of the message, we acknowledge that this 
procedure is less than optimal. F r o m  the perspective of c o g n i t i v e  
response theory, a pretest based on s u b j e c t s’ cognitive r e s p o n s e s  
w o u l d  be preferable. In that case, a m e s s a g e  that elicites 
primarily favorable thoughts would be d e fined as "strong", 
wh e r e a s  one elicites primarily counterarguments would be d e f i n e d  
as "weak". Data from the follwoing experiments will confirm, 
however, that the present set of arguments meets these criteria.
Note 2. Eleven subjects did not indicate w h i c h  fee they w o u l d  
consider appropriate. These refusals were independent of 
experimental conditions, chi2 (7) = 4.7, n.s.
Note 3. Five subjects did not indicate w h i c h  fee they w o u l d  
co n sider appropriate. T h e s e  refusals were independent of 
experimental conditions, chi2 (7) = 8.5, n.s.
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Focus of attention 







M o o d  
good bad
47.78 45 .63
4.6 * 5.4 *
4.7 * 3.0
53.98 * 59.29 * 51.11 5 4 . 0 0  *
56.43 * 4 8.75
Control group Approval: 3.3 
M o n e y  : 4 8 . 4 4
N o t e . Means with an asterisk d i f f e r  significantly f r o m  the 
control group at p < .05. The recomm e n d e d  fee is given in DM, the 
possible range of values for approval is 1 (= "strongly 
disapprove ") to 9 (= "strongly a p p r o v e " ) .
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Mean Proportions of Favorable and Unfavorable T h o u g h t s
Table 2
Fa v o r a b l e  Thoughts
strong arguments 
weak arguments
Focus of attention 
on arguments on language
Mood Mood










strong arguments .48 .33 .55 .35
weak arguments .54 .49 .50 .59
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Attitude change. Perceived Message Quality, and M e a n  Proportions 
of Favorable and Unfavorable Thoughts as a F u n c t i o n  of Message 





R e c o m m e n d e d  Fee
P e r c e i v e d  Quality
M e a n  Proportion of 
F a v o r a b l e  Thoughts
M e a n  Propor t i o n  of 
U n f a v o r a b l e  Thoughts
Bad Mood

























N o t e . The recomm e n d e d  Fee is given in DM, the possible range of 
values for approval and perceived q u a l i t y  is 1 (= "strongly 
disapprove" r e s p . "not strong at all") to 9 ("strongly approve" 
r e s p . "very strong").
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A p p r o v a 1
strong arguments 










strong arguments 51.00 52.55 53.75 5 3 . 1 0  
w e a k  arguments 51.22 4 6 . 4 3  52.30 5 0 . 0 0
N o t e . The recommended Fee is given in DM, the possible range 
values for approval is 1 (= "strongly disapprove") to 9 (= 
"strongly a p p r o v e " ) .
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Mean Proportions of Favorable and Unfavorable T h o u g h t s
Table 5



















strong arguments .39 .29 .26 .23
weak arguments .41 .60 .31 .45
rF i g u r e  1: R e p o r t e d  A t t i t u d e s  as a Function o f  M o o d  
a n d  the Q u a l i t y  of A r g u n e n t s
A p p r o v a l  o f  the
g o o d  bad
m o o d  no o d
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F i gure 2 : R e p o r t e d  A t t i t u d e s  as a F u n c t i o n  of 
Q u a l i t y  of A r g u n e n t s  and the Focus of A t t e n t i o n
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